Thursday, April 22, 2004

on deterrence

the recent release of mordechai vanunu has got me thinking about the concept of deterrence. in 1986 vanunu was kidnapped in rome, rushed back to israel and then imprisoned after he gave a detailed interview about israel's secret nuclear program. israel's program is usually justified by its defenders as necessary to deter invasions from its neighbors. what i don't get is if the israeli program is really for deterrence, why they kept it secret.

nuclear deterrence only works if one's enemies know that you pose a nuclear threat. israel's ability to deter attacks depends on and is premised upon the idea that other countries are aware that israel holds nuclear weapons and will use them if attacked. a secret nuclear program undermines the premises of deterrence. in that sense vanunu was only doing the israeli government a favor when he spoke to the press in rome. prior to 1986 many suspected that israel had nuclear arms, but vanunu provided first-hand testimony that established with a fair degree of certainty that israel was a nuclear power. that certainty could only strengthened israel's ability to deter an attack.

which is why it makes no sense for israelis to call him a traitor. his actions, at least, gave some purpose to israel's nuclear arsenal. without deterrence nuclear weapons have no point, other than the potential to cause an obscene amount of death and suffering.