as anyone who has read this site knows, i am not a fan of the president. and i think his policies in the middle east are particularly disastrous. but that does not mean that i want them to end in disaster. in fact, i would like nothing more than to be wrong about this issue. if the iraqi invasion somehow ended with a wave of democracy sweeping the region, i would welcome it. peace and prosperity in the region is simply more important than my ability to smugly say "i told you so." on the other hand, wishing something to be true does not make it any more likely to be true. peter pan was wrong about that one. sometimes i wonder if everyone learned that particular lesson when surf around the blogisphere and read condemnation of people for not having sufficiently happy thoughts. but i remain prepared to give the president his due credit if, in the end, i am proven wrong about this iraqi adventure.
that's the prologue, now the meat. here are a few things that should be remembered when people point to lebanon as a sign that the bush program for middle-eastern democracy is working:
(1) lebanon has had elections before (see, for example, this article)
lebanon is not the middle eastern paradigm the bush administration has cited where dictatorship are transformed into democracies in a wave emanating from baghdad. lebanon was not the usual middle eastern dictator situation. even under syrian occupation, they had parliamentary elections that were considered to be fairly free and fair. indeed, that is how hariri himself got into the lebanese parliament). that is not to say that syria didn't have undue influence over the formation of the lebanese government after elections, but the fact remains that lebanon is not a despotic regime. it should also be noted that the upcoming parliamentary elections in may 2005 were scheduled before hariri's assassination. they were not suddenly arranged in response to the current demonstrations
given lebanon's electoral experience, it's hard to imagine how the iraqi elections could have been much of an inspiration to the lebanese protestors. the iraqi elections did not result from street protests or a grass-roots movement like we are seeing in lebanon right now. a more likely source of inspiration would be the recent demonstrations in ukraine. lebanese opposition leaders themselves have said that they are consciously imitating the popular uprising in ukraine. it's true opposition leader walid jumblat has also cited iraq as a source of inspiration, but his comments seem a bit opportunistic to me considering his recent history.
furthermore, the iraqi elections are not the electoral model that most lebanonese would want to follow. for while the january 30, 2005 iraqi election had less violence than was expected, there still were several bombings. lebanese elections have been peaceful. the lebanese press is freer in lebanon than it currently is in iraq (e.g. al jazeera is not banned in lebanon). and, unlike in the january 30th iraqi elections, lebanese voters are aware of who they vote for in their past elections. in short, while the january 30th iraqi election was better than what iraqis had in the past, it was a couple of steps short on the democracy scale than what lebanon had already achieved.
(2) lebanon is not a "victory for democracy" because it's not yet clear that it's a victory
demanding syrian troops leave the country is the easy part. what happens when they leave is still unclear. syrian troops first entered the country to stop the lebanese civil war. and they did. but a lot of the problems that caused the civil war are still there. lebanon's christian minority still has disproportionate power in the government, which grows more disproportionate each year as their numbers shrink relative to the faster-growing muslim population. hezbollah is still popular among the shiites and has not disarmed. the southern part of the country has many angry poor palestinian refugees living in camps. that does not mean that the lebanese civil war will necessarily reignite when the syrians leave. but it is a possibility. it's also possible that something less than a civil war will start there--anything from low-level sectarian violence to political paralysis. it's also possible that something less democratic could replace the current syrian-sponsored system. again, i'm not saying that's certain to happen, only that it could happen. it's simply too early to tell. and it can be dangerous to declare success prematurely
(3) there is another side to the anti-syrian images we have been seeing
apropos of #2, hezbollah held a fairly large counter-demonstration today. as abu aardvark notes: "Just as the images of the anti-Syrian demonstrators made it impossible for anyone to deny that there was real popular sentiment against Syria, these images will make it hard for anyone to deny that there is also real popular sentiment in the other direction as well."
(4) we don't know who killed rafik al-hariri
the assassination of hariri is what sparked the protests and many have simply concluded that syria must have done it. there are plenty of reasons to think otherwise. that is not to say that i have ruled out syria's involvement. i simply don't know. but neither, i would bet, do most of the people condemning syria for the assassination.
