so the emerging consensus here in the u.s. is that everything bad in iraq is maliki's fault. which makes me wonder where this is heading.
i used to think that the leaders of the "new iraq" were immune to the dangers of a u.s.-backed coup. once saddam's lack operational relationship with al qaeda became clear and WMDs never materialized, democracy building was left as the only justification for going to iraq that wasn't discredited. if democracy building is the only point that remains viable, then there's a major disincentive to get behind something undemocratic like a coup. at best the u.s. could engineer a no-confidence vote in the parliament, that would at least follow the democratic script. nut even that was unlikely because there wasn't any obvious pro-american replacement to maliki. if the maliki government fell in a parliamentary move, it was quite possible that whoever emerged would be less supportive of the u.s.' program, not more.
so for a while it looked like maliki would get a pass. no matter how bad things got in iraq, the powers that be would point their fingers elsewhere, simply because maliki was the best they could reasonably hope for. i guess i underestimated the intense desire of washington insiders to deflect blame from themselves.
there's also something else. the president doesn't talk about democracy building in iraq as much as he used to. in fact, the administration doesn't bring up why we went there much at all. the focus now is more defensive. it's about the dangers of leaving, not the point in staying. indeed, it seems like the point in staying these days is nothing more than avoiding the dangers of leaving. (there's little talk of the dangers of staying)
with the emphasis off of democracy building, maliki is vulnerable to a u.s.-backed coup. isn't that the implication of all of this talk? why else would americans be debating whether maliki should stay or go on sunday talk shows unless we think we can make him go?
the coup option avoids the problem that the democratic process is unlikely to produce a pro-american iraqi leader. by all accounts ayad allawi, allawi is the only post-invasion iraqi prime minister who was appointed by the americans, not elected. in fact, he left office after an embarrassing defeat in the first iraqi election. in the last election, his party, the iraqi national list, did even worse, receiving only 8% of the votes (by comparison, 8% is less than what ross perot got in the 1996 election. 1996, as you may recall, was his second run for presidency--the one in which he performed so badly it got him to leave politics and effectively ended the reform party movement).
for the u.s. to overthrow the maliki government and install the wildly unpopular allawi in his place would be yet another major mistake. it would shatter that last pretense that the u.s. cares about iraqi democracy and impose an unpopular figure on the iraqi populace who would be likely to stir up more rebellion, not less. but the u.s. hasn't shied away from spectacularly stupid decisions about iraq so far, why should we expect it to start now? especially when it would serve our own politicians' short-term interest of avoiding culpability for the deteriorating situation in iraq.
